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IN PRAISE OF DERIVATIVE SUITS: A
COMMENTARY ON THE PAPER OF
PROFESSORS FISCHEL AND BRADLEYt
Donald E. Schwartz $
INTRODUCTION
There are not many surprises in the paper that Professors Fis-
chel and Bradley (F&B) have prepared for this conference.' The
paper is lucidly written and carefully structured; it presents data of-
fered to establish that lawyers' intervention in the marketplace pro-
vides little value and that the enforcement of liability rules that tax
corporate managers are not worthwhile. Moreover, as expected, the
paper is provocative and raises questions which any proponent of
the continued use of liability rules and derivative suits must answer.
Alas, I do not find most of their conclusions persuasive, and this too
is not surprising.
F&B believe that liability rules, and the derivative suits that are
used to enforce them, are relatively unimportant in promoting de-
sirable management behavior and in reducing agency costs. 2 They
t © 1985. Donald E. Schwartz. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1952, Union Col-
lege; LL.B. 1955, Harvard University; LL.M. (in taxation) 1966, New York University.
Professor Schwartz is a consultant to the AL Project referred to herein.
1 Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 261 (1986) [hereinafter cited as
F&B].
2 Fischel and Bradley (F&B) appear to argue in several places that liability rules
and derivative suits should be abolished. At one point they state that an "[a]nalysis of
[several] factors suggests that liability rules play a relatively minor role in assuring con-
tractual performance by corporate managers in publicly-held corporations." Id. at 263.
Further on, the authors contend that
[m]any analyses of corporate law assume that liability rules enforced by
derivative suits play a fundamental role in aligning the interests of man-
agers and investors. We have shown that this widespread assumption is
not supported by either the theory of liability rules, the available empiri-
cal evidence, or the structure of corporate law.
Id. at 292. F&B concede that the survival of the derivative suit "suggests it has some
value," id. at 286-87, but they find this value only in the suit's ability to deter large one-
shot frauds. Id.
At the conference where they presented their paper, F&B denied a charge that they
were sub silentio proposing abolishing derivative suits. Instead, they claimed to favor
the existing legal scheme. This assertion seems disingenuous or at best renders their
conclusion humdrum given the sharp criticism they level at rules and procedures which
are so much a part of the conventional wisdom of corporate law.
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maintain that these rules fail for several reasons: the high cost and
great difficulty in structuring a contract that adequately defines man-
agers' duties;3 the threat to an otherwise valuable relationship; 4 the
superior efficiency of information markets in disciplining manage-
ment;5 the chilling effect of liability rules on sensible risk taking;
6
and the existence of less costly alternative methods of assuring
proper conduct. 7 Moreover, F&B claim that certain principles of
corporate law reduce the scope of liability rules, further demonstrat-
ing their relative insignificance."
My own conclusions differ in virtually all respects. Liability
rules, enforced by shareholder litigation, are theoretically sound
and profoundly affect the conduct of corporate managers, at least
some aspects of their duties. Moreover, although I recognize that
this system is not costless, I believe that the benefits outweigh the
costs, a conclusion, I hasten to add, that is based on experience
rather than statistical data. I agree, however, with F&B's observa-
tion that certain principles of corporate law reduce the effectiveness
of these liability rules, and I favor efforts, mainly those undertaken
by the American Law Institute, to strengthen certain substantive
corporate law provisions that will enhance the viability of derivative
suits and address the cost issues. Reform must be undertaken from
two perspectives because practices by both plaintiffs and defendants
pose threats to the litigation process. Collusive settlements involv-
ing and encouraged by plaintiffs' counsel undermine recoveries by
shareholders and corporations, while biased internal corporate pro-
cedures cut off the plaintiffs' access to impartial determination of
their claims. Although each separate act may be cost-justified, the
abuses by both sides may also impose significant burdens on the
system, with a potential loss of the benefit of deterrence. 9
I do not mean to suggest that liability rules and enforcement
mechanisms are the only devices appropriate to hold corporate
managers accountable and reduce agency costs. The mechanisms
F&B describe in their paper are all useful. 10 Indeed, I have more
confidence in some of them, such as the increased use of independ-
ent directors, than Professor Fischel has.' I do not believe, how-
3 Id. at 264-66.
4 Id. at 268-70.
5 Id. at 267-68.
6 Id. at 270-74.
7 Id. at 274-76.
8 Id. at 283-87.
9 See Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation,
48 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1985).
10 F&B, supra note 1, at 274-76.
11 See Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VND. L. REv. 1259, 1283
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ever, that any single method, such as the operation of the various
markets, is adequate. I am therefore reluctant to abandon reliance
on a system that has long been regarded as the heart of the account-
ability devices.
I
DUTIES OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
Modem corporate law, as applied to publicly-owned corpora-
tions, builds on the assumption that stock ownership is separate
from control.' 2 The stock of most publicly-held corporations is
widely dispersed, and managers tend to own relatively small per-
centages of the stock of companies that they control.'
t
The separation of control from ownership demands a system of
accountability. To allow managers to wield power over other peo-
ple's money without subjecting them to certain constraints is un-
thinkable. Corporate law has devised rules which perform the
function of a standard form contract between the corporation, or its
shareholders, and the managers for this purpose.' 4
Corporate law imposes two duties on all managers: the duty of
due care and the duty of loyalty.' 5 The duty of due care addresses
both the decisionmaking function of managers and their obligation
to monitor the activities of lower echelon employees. The board of
directors is expected to monitor the performance of senior manage-
ment and select their successors. Directors also make some key
business decisions, and they must exercise appropriate care in dis-
charging this duty.
The duty of loyalty is concerned with self-dealing. At one time,
corporate law prohibited all transactions between directors and the
corporation. Ultimately, however, courts came to understand that
the prohibition of all such dealings was not in the interest of the
corporation or the shareholders.' 6 This stringent rule was replaced
by a flexible rule that permitted such transactions as long as they
were openly disclosed to disinterested persons acting on behalf of
the corporation and as long as the transactions were fair. Self-deal-
(1982) (board with majority of independent directors will not necessarily increase share-
holders' wealth).
12 See A. BERLE: & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATIONS AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
113 (1932) (owners hold "legal and factual interests" in enterprise but not "legal and
factual powers over it").
13 M. NEWCOMER, THE BIG BuSINESs EXECUTIVE 105 (1955).
14 Fischel, supra note 11, at 1264.
15 E.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) ("A
board member's obligation to a corporation and its shareholders ... [is] generally char-
acterized as the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.").
16 Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAw.
35 (1966).
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ing transactions include not only directors' purchases of corporate
assets or sales of directors' assets to the corporation, but also trans-
actions in the stock of the company and directors' self-utilization of
opportunities that might be considered business opportunities of
the corporation.
Corporate law treats abuses of the duty of loyalty more harshly
than abuses of the duty of due care. The law's greater comfort in
dealing with unfairness than with inefficiency may partially explain
this differential treatment. This focus is sensible not only because it
confines courts to what they do best and because it tends to avoid
the higher costs involved in policing breaches of the duty of due
care, but also because self-dealing is the more serious problem.
One of the most important principles in corporate law is the
business judgment rule, by which courts defer to the decisions of
directors and officers that involve no self-dealing and minimize the
threat of liability for erroneous decisions. 17 The result of the busi-
ness judgment rule is that few cases are brought against directors
for bad decisions and still fewer cases succeed in imposing liabil-
ity.'8 One of F&B's concerns about the existence of liability rules is
that "a poor outcome will be equated with poor performance" and
if agents are penalized for poor outcomes as well as poor perform-
ance, they will tend to undertake lower risk projects. This ten-
dency to cause agents to behave in a more risk-averse manner is
itself a potentially large cost of liability rules as a governance
mechanism in contractual situations where principals want agents
to behave in a more risk-neutral manner. 19
This gloomy prediction is made without reference to the business
judgment rule, although F&B acknowledge the rule some thirteen
pages later.2
0
The business judgment rule should also alleviate F&B's con-
cern that avaricious lawyers will press trivial or unmeritorious deriv-
ative suits. 21 The rule minimizes this risk because a plaintiff's lawyer
who brings a derivative suit on a contingent fee basis and who ex-
pends substantial time and effort to prove his case is very likely to
17 See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979).
18 Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in Indemnification of Corporate Di-
rectors and Officers, 77 YALE LJ. 1078, 1099 (1968) ("The search for cases in which direc-
tors of industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence
uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very
large haystack.").
19 F&B, supra note 1, at 270. F&B later advocate a market solution to poor manage-
ment and note that managers who make bad choices are likely to lose theirjobs. See id.
at 268, 275. If their assertion is true, the risk of liability is a relatively unimportant factor
in making managers unduly risk-averse.
20 Id. at 283-84.
21 Id. at 271-74.
19861 COMMENTS 325
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
discover that he has drilled a dry hole for all his efforts. Assuming
that the lawyer is rational, he will be disinclined to institute a deriva-
tive action to recover damages based upon a poor result because the
risk of failure is too great; he will observe the old adage, "Don't
send good money after bad."
The duty of due care also requires directors and senior manag-
ers to be prudent and to monitor the work of others. If losses result
from their seriously negligent failure to supervise, they are exposed
to liability. But this variation of duty of care liability is unlikely to
impose significant burdens on management. The law that prevails
in Delaware, for instance, requires a showing not simply of negli-
gence but of gross negligence, thus significantly reducing the likeli-
hood of liability.
22
Consequently, management's greatest liability exposure is for
breaches of the duty of loyalty. Such cases are far more appealing to
lawyers who bring suits on contingent fee bases. They are easier to
prove, and their facts typically glean more sympathy from judges
andjuries. The legal rules relax the burden of proof for plaintiffs in
cases involving the duty of loyalty.2 3 Without actually having made
a head count, I am satisfied that over ninety percent of the litigation
involving breaches of duty by directors and officers involves cases
claiming a breach of the duty of loyalty.
24
F&B assert that the distinction between the duty of care and the
duty of loyalty is artificial because both involve agency costs that
reduce shareholder wealth.25 This purported analysis is too shal-
low. Although shirking and theft can each cause injury, the incen-
tive to self-deal carries with it far greater rewards than does
shirking. Shirking provides leisure time; self-dealing can produce
large monetary rewards. Moreover, persons who rise to important
management positions tend to be ambitious and industrious and are
22 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963) (varied definitions of "gross negligence"
prevent uniform application of rule). See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 31-
37, 432 A.2d 814, 821-25 (1981) (directors' duty of care varies according to nature of
business). At a minimum, however, courts will probably demand proof of "sustained
patterns of inattention" to find liability. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF COR-
PoRATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 29 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985)
[hereinafter cited as ALI PROJECT].
23 See Norlin Corp., 744 F.2d at 264 ("Once a prima facie showing is made that direc-
tors have a self-interest in a particular corporate transaction, the burden shifts to them
to demonstrate that the transaction is fair and serves the best interests of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.").
24 The ALI reporters found only approximately 30 appellate cases in the twentieth
century affirming violations of the duty of due care. ALI PROJECT, supra note 22, at 28-
29.
25 F&B, supra note 1, at 291. In the draft presented at the conference, F&B de-
scribed the distinction as "artificial."
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unlikely to avoid hard work.26 Therefore, shirking is not really the
problem. Moreover, practice, more than theory, limits derivative
suits mostly to breaches of the duty of loyalty rather than the duty of
due care. Theoretically, the interest of the corporation would be in
recovering its losses, and in deterring other losses, whatever the
source. The value of the derivative suit is not called into question
by a theoretical deficiency, but rather by practical deficiencies which
apply almost exclusively to losses from the failure to exercise due
care. By no means do these practical limitations call into question
the theory of derivative suits or their value. If practical limitations
do not apply, or apply only to a lesser degree, the theory underlying
derivative suits retains force.
II
THE THEORETICAL CASE FOR DERIVATIVE SUITS
The theoretical case in favor of liability rules enforced by share-
holder litigation is, I believe, a strong case, and neither contrary the-
oretical considerations nor any empirical data that F&B present
refute it. Although F&B suggest in their first sentence that the pri-
mary purpose of liability rules is to "create incentives to engage in
socially desirable conduct,'" 27 liability rules also compensate those
who have been injured. 28 Even if compensation is not the principal
function of liability rules, it is their occasional function. One reason
I believe F&B overlooked this compensatory aspect is that their
model for shareholder litigation only considers the derivative suit,
ignoring shareholder litigation that is brought as a class action in
which the shareholders may personally recover for their injuries. 29
Even if we focus only on the derivative suit in which the corpo-
ration recovers any damages30 and where most certainly the princi-
pal purpose is to deter improper conduct, the theoretical case is a
strong one. It is especially strong as applied to breaches of the duty
of loyalty.3 ' Corporate managers, by definition, are not capable of
policing the injurious conduct because they are responsible for it
and have profited from it. Judicial oversight in these suits does not
26 See M. MAcCOBY, THE GAMESMAN (1976).
27 F&B, supra note 1, at 261.
28 Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 106-08, 460 P.2d 464, 470-71, 81
Cal. Rptr. 592, 598-99 (1969) (en banc) (allowing individual cause of action for breach
of fiduciary duty).
29 See id. at 107, 460 P.2d at 470, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
30 On rare occasions the recovery in a derivative suit is paid directly to innocent
shareholders to prevent windfall gains by offending shareholders. Perlman v. Feld-
mann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
31 The theoretical case for derivative suits is set out in ALI PROJECT, supra note 22,
at 3-5 (Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985).
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question managers' objective business decisions but rather is lim-
ited to those things that courts do best. The derivative suit thus
provides a remedy that is not burdened by the necessity of requiring
concerted action by shareholders. Furthermore, in a derivative suit
the plaintiff's counsel is compensated only when successful because
he operates on a contingent fee basis. Private enforcers with proper
incentives reduce the need for government supervision which, but
for the activities of private enforcers, would be necessary. As the
ALI Reporters note, "[t]he most important claim that can . . . be
made for the derivative action is that it can reduce average agency
CoStS."
3 2
The ALI Reporters also note that one of the most important
uses for derivative suits is to protect the market for corporate con-
trol.33 The value of the derivative suit in this context has only re-
cently been realized. When confronted with a hostile tender offer,
target company management often resorts to various devices to
thwart the bid, consequently denying shareholders a profitable op-
portunity. Whether this conduct is in the best long-term interest of
the corporation is debatable, but who bears the immediate cost and
who reaps the short-term benefits is clear. Professor Fischel, and his
colleague Professor (now Judge) Easterbrook, have surely been two
of the most vigorous foes of target management's efforts to block
hostile tender offers.34 Shareholders have challenged many of these
tactics, but most of the suits have been unsuccessful. 35 The business
judgment rule has been an obstacle to recovery when the defensive
measures were authorized by so-called independent directors who
allegedly are capable of making an objective decision because their
jobs are not at stake in the takeover bid.36 Recently, the courts,
37
32 Id. at 13. This point is expanded upon in Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the
Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 745, 746-48
(1984).
33 ALI PROJECT, supra note 22, at 4 (Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985).
34 See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to
a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (legal rules should inhibit managers' ability
to thwart tender offers).
35 See, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983)
(district court lacked authority to judge substantive validity of anti-takeover device), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.)
(business judgment rule protects anti-takeover actions), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (business judg-
ment rule applies if directors can show "reasonable grounds for believing" takeover
would endanger corporate policy).
36 Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955 (approval by outside independent directors en-
hances proof that approval of takeover deterrent was reasonable).
37 Norlin Corp., 744 F.2d at 265-66 (directors must demonstrate that anti-takeover
actions were "fair and reasonable").
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Congress,3 8 and the SEC have questioned the premise on which this
judicial deference is based.3 9 Consequently, changes in the wind
may curtail the ability of target managers and target boards to de-
feat a tender offer by manipulating the corporate machinery. I do
not think the market, acting without assistance from liability rules,
can sufficiently protect shareholders. The market has not rendered
the rules irrelevant, even though it did ultimately discipline some
targets that were able to thwart a takeover bid and resist judicial
challenge, such as Marshall Field; but the experience is by no means
universal. To be sure, the courts must become sensitive to the na-
ture of the resistance undertaken by target managers and their
boards so that the liability rules may function effectively. The point
is that the courts have the capability of keeping the market for cor-
porate control free from distortion.
40
The theoretical argument for maintaining and even strengthen-
ing the role of liability rules and derivative suits is soundly, and even
conservatively, based. Derivative suits assist in maintaining the effi-
ciency of our economic system. No basis exists for believing that
proponents of such rules proceed from the premises "that corpo-
rate managers systematically act in ways contrary to investors' best in-
terests." 41 Proponents of strengthening derivative suits no more
urge that corporate managers "systematically" act contrary to inves-
tors' best interests than do proponents of tender offers who justify
the unfettered functioning of such offers as necessary to discipline
inefficient managers. Rather, proponents of each of these devices
apparently recognize the value of accountability devices for reduc-
ing agency costs and promoting corporate efficiency. In my view,
both derivative suits and tender offers are important, even vital, to
the functioning of the system.
III
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
F&B's empirical data does not confirm, nor even strengthen,
their argument. I lack sufficient training to dispute the relevancy of
the formula F&B employ or the accuracy of the numbers shown by
the University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices.
42 I
note, however, that twenty-eight cases is a small sample. Indeed
F&B's sample is not as extensive as my own anecdotal experience in
38 H.R. 5695, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (corporation has burden of proof that
anti-takeover actions were prudent and fair to shareholders).
39 See Legal Times, Apr. 23, 1984, at 35.
40 See Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents For Target Shareholders in Tender
Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53 (1985).
41 F&B, supra note 1, at 262 (emphasis added).
42 F&B's empirical data and results are reported in id. at 277-83, 293-97.
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the field, and it is far smaller than the experience of persons with
whom I have compared experiences.
A more serious quarrel with the usefulness of the data is that it
measures stock prices occurring around a nonevent, or at best a
highly ambiguous event. What, after all, should the marketplace
make of the filing of a lawsuit or its termination prior to a decision
on the merits? Did the complaint state a good cause of action that
holds promise of an award to the corporation or its shareholders?
Did the filing of the lawsuit demonstrate that management was inef-
ficient, or worse? Has a knowledgeable analyst studied the com-
plaint at the time of filing to judge its probable success? The same
questions arise at the time of termination. Did the plaintiff abandon
anything of value? Did the termination of the lawsuit change the
status quo? Who is adequately informed to be able to make such a
judgment? The data's ambiguity is further compounded because
disclosure of the event or the litigation reveals both an alleged in-
jury to the corporation or shareholders (cost) and a possible recov-
ery (benefit). The cost probably influences the market more than
the benefit, but the market would surely react more severely if there
were only costs to contemplate without prospect of possible
recovery.
The period of time in which F&B chose to examine stock prices
is also faulty.43 Most private suits are filed in response to the public
disclosure of an event. Stock prices are more likely to react to the
public disclosure of the litigable facts than to the filing of the unsur-
prising lawsuit. For example, Union Carbide prices declined upon
news of the catastrophe in Bhopal, not upon the filing of the already
discounted lawsuit.44 I would think the efficient market would have
it no other way.
F&B also fail to account for the suit that is too small to materi-
ally affect the corporation's earnings. A theft of ten million dollars
from IBM is trivial to the company; a lawyer making a representa-
tion to an auditor would regard litigation over such an amount as
immaterial. Neither the loss nor its recovery is financially signifi-
cant. Should we ignore the theft because the market did not react?
If F&B's study required this conclusion, I fear that the reaction of
government agencies and more particularly investors in general
would be harsh. Indeed, would not the market discount for all
agency costs increase dramatically?
Thus, in general, F&B's event study is largely irrelevant. Most
43 F&B look solely at judicial decisions to terminate or continue a derivative suit,
not at public disclosure of the litigated facts or settlement. Id. at 277.
44 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1984, § D, at 16, col. 6; id., Dec. 5, 1984, § D, at 10, col.
330 [Vol. 71:322
of the lawsuits covered by their study involved amounts which, if
fully recovered, would have barely affected earnings per share. Ter-
mination of these suits involved abandonment of relatively insignifi-
cant amounts. Yet the study reveals a small decline in stock prices,
thus suggesting that derivative suits are worthier than F&B suspect.
Nor would one expect a significant market reaction to the filing of
the suit. The market has been conditioned to expect little from the
filing of a suit because courts are inclined to grant motions to termi-
nate based upon the recommendation of a special litigation commit-
tee. The events under study do not provide an opportunity to
develop much understanding of liability rules or derivative suits.
F&B observe that their own conclusions cannot be pushed too
far because the sample is small and because it does not measure the
final resolution of litigation.45 I can understand the desire to amor-
tize the cost of the CRSP tape, but I think that this experiment goes
too far.
In sum, my main objection to F&B's use of their data to prove
that liability and recovery rules are without effect on investor wealth
is that F&B study the ex post effects of a mechanism for which the
rationale is essentially its ex ante impact. Deterrence is the major
reason for and principal effect of derivative suits. 46 Data on stock
prices cannot measure the deterrent effect on management behavior
achieved by liability rules that can be readily enforced by private
parties. With all modesty, I believe my own anecdotal experience
and the experience of more seasoned lawyers in the board room is
relevant. For many years, the late Abe Pomerantz, the dean of the
derivative suit bar, was an unseen presence in the board room when-
ever major transactions were considered. Today Mel Weiss and
Lowell Sachnoff have replaced him. The plausible threat of a share-
holder suit has influenced the terms of many transactions and dis-
cquraged others from being undertaken. Experience suggests that
transactions that boards scrutinized in this manner were almost al-
ways self-dealing transactions involving serious questions of fair-
ness. Rarely, in my experience, has fear of a derivative suit affected
transactions within the scope of the business judgment rule. In ad-
dition, the terms of the transactions, when approved, often provide
greater benefits, in the form of a better price, to the corporation or
to the shareholders. Finally, this process improves the quantity and
quality of the information provided to the marketplace.
45 F&B, supra note 1, at 282.
46 See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Propo-
salfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 302-09 (1981) (deterrence is better ra-
tionale for derivative suits than compensating wronged shareholder).
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IV
SPECIFIC CRITIQUE OF DERIVATIVE SUITS
I would like now to turn to some of the specific criticisms that
F&B level against the utility of liability rules in reducing agency
costs.
F&B initially note that managers' obligations depend upon con-
tract, but specifying the performance obligations in the contract is
difficult and hence costly.4 7 The contract, however, is essentially
one of adhesion, consisting of the broad statutory requirement to
act in good faith and exercise due care, in addition to the more
finely detailed requirements that have emerged through common
law. F&B fear that courts will improperly and restrictively apply the
contract because "most lawsuits follow poor outcomes [and] courts
naturally tend to assume that such outcomes are a product of bad
actions."'48 Experience does not bear out this observation, however,
because their fear overlooks the effect of the business judgment
rule. Since the benefits of an enforcement remedy are contingent
on a successful judgment, shareholders will challenge only the most
glaring departures from behavior. Thus, the vagueness of the "con-
tract" has not produced a large body of frivolous litigation. Plain-
tiffs' lawyers aim to achieve a high percentage of winners, and they
have generally succeeded in obtaining favorable outcomes for their
clients.49 This result is accomplished because lawyers avoid litigat-
ing those cases where all they can show is a bad outcome. 50
F&B's observation that it is costly to monitor the effort or out-
put of individual managers, thereby making it difficult to use liability
rules effectively as a remedy for managers' "lack of effort," 51 is a
valid point, but one whose thrust is aimed more at the duty of due
care than the duty of loyalty. Of course, plaintiffs' lawyers are
acutely aware of the difficulty, reserving their efforts for the most
egregious cases.
F&B also make the sound point that shareholders should not
assert some claims because, on balance, the corporation is best
served by not upsetting a valuable relationship. 52 This observation,
however, should not be overstated. Sometimes the defendant is a
47 F&B, supra note 1, at 264-66.
48 Id. at 265.
49 See Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and Class
Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60 B.U.L. REV. 306, 307 (1980) (commentators have exag-
gerated the "explosion of shareholder litigation").
50 SeeJones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class
Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. REV. 542, 545 (1980) (plaintiffs received some relief in over
three-fourths of studied lawsuits).
51 F&B, supra note 1, at 265.
52 Id. at 269.
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former officer or director with whom the company no longer has a
continuing relationship. Furthermore, the lawsuit will not always in-
volve the board of directors, thus leaving any relationship intact.
For instance, when liability rules are enforced by a class action
rather than a derivative suit, no demand on the board of directors is
necessary, nor does the board of directors have any power to termi-
nate the suit. A class action is a dispute between shareholders in
their individual capacity and officers, directors, and sometimes the
corporation itself as defendants. No colleague need harshly judge
another colleague, and the relationship may continue into the future
regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit. The point worth ex-
tracting from F&B's observation is that in a derivative suit, where
the board does have a role to play, terminating the lawsuit prior to a
judgment on the merits is often in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. I agree that the power to dismiss should be recognized. I disa-
gree with F&B as to the scope of this power and the manner in
which it is exercised and reviewed.
F&B repeat an oft-stated charge that "[t]he greater the threat of
litigation, the less willing those who remain with the firm will be to
make firm-specific investments of human capital." 53 If the liability
rules are generally applicable to all corporations, that chilling effect
is unlikely to occur simply because there will be no competitive firm
to whom those persons can turn and thereby escape the rules.
The authors note that liability rules implicate special problems
in the corporate context. For example, plaintiffs' attorneys, who are
the engine of the derivative suit mechanism, "have very poor incen-
tives to maximize shareholders' wealth." 54 That observation ig-
nores the fact that plaintiffs' attorneys recover nothing at all if they
do not succeed in the lawsuit and that the extent of their success
determines the size of the fee, at least in part.55 Plaintiffs' lawyers
have little incentive to consume their time on suits that have a low
prospect of success or for that matter a low prospect of substantial
recovery. Although abusive conduct does exist, remedies short of
those F&B imply are available.
The authors also suggest that shareholder suits create a risk of
strategic behavior by minorities. They show that corporate law dis-
courages such strategic behavior by permitting transactions to pro-
ceed with majority approval rather than unanimous consent. In
53 Id. at 270.
54 Id. at 271.
55 F&B note that this area is beyond the scope of their paper, but it is highly rele-
vant to considering the overall scope of derivative suits. Incentives based more on value
created than on time expended probably best serve the shareholder's interest. See Cof-
fee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not
Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215 (1983).
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contrast, a single shareholder may initiate a lawsuit to block a
favorable transaction in order to gain a disproportionate benefit. 56
The strategic games that a shareholder can play when the rules de-
mand unanimity, however, are not the same games that a litigant
plays. A shareholder may withhold consent according to his own
whims. He is accountable to no one, and the game is over when he
says it is. But a litigant who plays a strategic game by bringing a
derivative suit will bear all his own costs and expenses if an objective
party-a court-decides that his suit lacks merit. His game is over
when a court says it is. Surely this obstacle should discourage stra-
tegically motivated or even ill-informed lawsuits. F&B are nonethe-
less correct in observing that derivative litigation may produce
undue costs, and some reform of the law is probably appropriate to
minimize this drawback. Imposing attorney's fees on trigger-happy
lawyers may well be a useful control on this behavior.
V
CORPORATE STRUCTURE: NOT A BAR TO DERIVATIVE SUITS
F&B argue that principles of corporate law reduce the scope of
liability rules, rendering derivative suits still more insignificant. In
particular, they cite (A) the business judgment rule, (B) the substitu-
tion of procedural for substantive rules in self-dealing transactions,
(C) the liberal rights of indemnification and insurance, (D) the ex-
clusivity of appraisal rights, and (E) the restrictions on plaintiffs'
ability to bring derivative suits. 5 7 I believe that they exaggerate con-
siderably the restraining effect of corporate law, although they point
out several areas in which change is desirable.
A. Business Judgment Rule
F&B contend that the business judgment rule precludes liability
in a wide variety of situations. 58 The business judgment rule im-
poses an appropriate limitation on the right to bring and to recover
damages in a derivative suit, but the rule does not apply to cases
alleging self-dealing. Although courts have misapplied the rule
from time to time to protect essentially self-dealing transactions,
such cases are hardly the rule. Moreover, even absent self-dealing,
the business judgment rule has not precluded suits based upon to-
tally indefensible business decisions nor those based upon grossly
negligent conduct of corporate managers. I disagree with Profes-
sors Scott and Weiss who believe that derivative suits should play no
56 F&B, supra note 1, at 272.
57 See id. at 283-86.
58 See id. at 283-84.
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role in cases involving a breach of the duty of due care or a failure
by managers to monitor,59 but I agree that shareholders should
rarely bring such suits. 60 Courts have probably gone too far in pro-
tecting managers in due care cases, however, because of a fear of
imposing ruinous liability in situations where the managers did not
personally profit.6 1 Limiting liability or creating other remedies is
desirable so that the courts will not find it necessary to distort the
substantive standards of care that should properly apply in order to
avoid an excessive award of damages. The ALI's proposal to limit
recovery to the director's direct compensation from the corporation
during the year in which the violation occurred, except for egre-
gious cases, moves in that direction.
62
B. Substantive or Procedural Rules
F&B allege that in self-dealing cases corporate law requires
that courts review only the process by which such transactions were
approved, rather than their substance. To F&B this requirement
further demonstrates the impotence of liability rules. 63 Once again,
I disagree. Corporate law does not, in my opinion, substitute proce-
dural for substantive review of self-dealing transactions.
Some corporation statutes, such as section 144 of the Delaware
Corporation Law, appear to validate a self-dealing transaction with-
out regard to its fairness if independent directors have approved it.
A literal reading aside, corporate law generally permits judicial re-
view of the fairness of a self-dealing transaction although it shifts the
burden of proof on the question of fairness to a plaintiff if the trans-
action has been fully disclosed to independent directors and ap-
proved by them.64 Section 5.01 of the ALI Project accurately states
59 Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35
STAN. L. REv. 927, 935-37 (1983); Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALI
Corporate Governance Project, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 13-17 (1984).
60 Egregious situations will always need redress, lest directors or managers come to
believe that abdication of their functions is acceptable. See Francis v. United Jersey
Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981) (defendant director negligent for failing to notice
misappropriation of corporate funds held in implied trust).
61 Bellis v. Thal, 373 F. Supp. 120, 133 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affidmem., 510 F.2d 969 (3d
Cir. 1975) (disallowing recovery for shrinkage of corporate assets despite showing that
defendants acted willfully and maliciously).
62 ALl PROJECT, supra note 22, § 7.16 reporter's note, at 221-22 (Discussion Draft
No. 1, 1985). The ALI Council, which governs the institute, has not yet accepted or
rejected the proposal to limit liability. Id., comment h, at 201.
63 See F&B, supra note 1, at 284.
64 See Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241
P.2d 66 (1952) (self-dealing transaction voided because of unfairness to minority share-
holders despite statutory compliance); see also Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44
(D.N.J. 1974) (statute does not alter traditional fiduciary duty); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361
A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976) (same); Aronoffv. Albanese, 85 A.D.2d 3, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368
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the law. That section states that a director or senior executive vio-
lates the duty of loyalty if he has not made adequate disclosure or, to
oversimplify the language, if the transaction was not reasonably be-
lieved to be fair to the corporation by independent directors.65
These criteria require a court to review both the procedure and the
substance of the transaction. A number of judicial decisions sup-
port this outcome regardless of the wording of the applicable corpo-
ration statute.66
C. Indemnification and Insurance
As F&B note, management's entitlement to indemnification and
insurance does soften the effect of liability provisions, 67 but it does
not relegate them to insignificance. First, indemnification in a deriv-
ative suit does not cover the amount of the judgment, only the ex-
penses involved in the litigation.68 Although this point seems
obvious, it deserves mention because I so often find it misunder-
stood. Second, if the litigation involves violations of the federal se-
curities laws, public policy considerations may make indemnification
unavailable. 69 Third, although the law may allow companies to offer
insurance beyond indemnification, insurance companies generally
will narrow their coverage to exclude coverage for fraud or other
serious misconduct. Insurance contracts often exclude all coverage
for claims under the federal securities laws, contain deductible fea-
tures that leave insureds exposed to more than trivial amounts, 70
(1982) (same); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31 comment 1 (1984) (transac-
tion involving self-dealing may be voidable despite meeting statutory tests).
65 ALI PROJECT, supra note 22, § 5.01(a) (Council Draft No. 2, Nov. 1985).
66 See cases cited supra note 64.
Section 8.31 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act uses standard statu-
tory language to prevent the invalidation of all self-dealing transactions, i.e., if they have
been approved by disinterested directors, or if they have been approved by disinterested
shareholders, or if they are fair, but the comment thereto states:
The elimination of the automatic rule of voidability does not mean that
all transactions that meet one or more of the tests set forth in section
8.31 (a) are automatically valid. These transactions may be subject to at-
tack on a variety of grounds independent of section 8.31-for example,
that the transaction constituted waste, that it was not authorized by the
appropriate corporate body, that it violated other sections of the Model
Business- Corporation Act, or that it was unenforceable under other com-
mon law principles.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31 comment 1 (1984).
67 F&B, supra note 1, at 284-85.
68 See Mattar, Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Corporate Boards of Directors and
Trustees-A Legal Guide for the Director, 83 COM. LJ. 550, 553 (1978) (discussing California,
Delaware, and New York law).
69 Cf. Globus v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287-89 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (denying enforcement of indemnification clause between is-
suer and underwriter).
70 Mattar, supra note 68, at 556.
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and exclude reimbursement for self-dealing violations.7 1 Moreover,
some companies find insurance simply unavailable. Thus, insurance
coverage may not be as helpful in practice as it appears to be in
theory.
D. Appraisal
F&B contend that because the appraisal remedy, whereby
shareholders may not block a transaction but are confined to a mon-
etary award equal to the fair value of their shares, is effectively the
exclusive remedy in connection with mergers and certain other
transactions, it minimizes the importance of liability rules in that im-
portant context.7 2 Again, they overstate the case. In Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc.,73 the Delaware Supreme Court indicated that appraisal
may be inappropriate as an exclusive remedy "in certain cases, par-
ticularly where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate
waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are
involved."' 74 Section 13.02(b) of the revised Model Business Corpo-
ration Act does not limit shareholders to an exclusive appraisal rem-
edy. 75 Similarly, the ALI Project, in a tentative position announced
in Reporter's Study No. 1, would limit the exclusivity of the ap-
praisal remedy to transactions that do not involve the duty of loy-
alty.76 Thus, much activity remains subject to liability rules
notwithstanding the existence of an appraisal remedy.
E. Restrictions on Derivative Suits
The authors note that restrictions on plaintiffs' ability to bring
derivative suits further curtails the efficacy of liability rules as a
means of constraining management. 77 Their point is valid, but it
has limits they do not acknowledge. A number of the restraints they
recite are not significant. For example, the contemporaneous own-
ership rule and the rules that require the plaintiff to post security for
expenses are not significant curtailments of the use of derivative
suits. Legislatures may have intended these restraints to be deter-
rents, but because they are ineffective, they should probably be
eliminated or modified. 78
Moreover, the restrictions F&B discuss do not apply to class ac-
71 Id.
72 See F&B, supra note 1, at 285-86.
73 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
74 Id. at 714. See Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
75 REVISED MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT § 13.02(b) (1984) (appraisal not exclusive
remedy if transaction was unlawful or fraudulent).
76 ALl PROJECT, supra note 22 (Reporter's Study No. 1, Feb. 22, 1985).
77 See F&B, supra note 1, at 286.
78 See Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4
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tions, and not all liability rules are enforced in derivative suits.
Some of the most significant cases involving liability rules, such as
Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 79 which challenged management's ac-
tions in denying minority shareholders an equal opportunity to im-
prove the marketability of their shares, were brought as a class
action.
Futhermore, not all shareholders' substantive rights are en-
forced under state corporation law. Many cases are brought under
the federal securities laws where the restrictive rules do not apply.
The federal securities laws do involve essentially failures to disclose,
but these cases can still raise substantive questions of fiduciary con-
duct.8 0 For example, in Goldberg v. Meridor8 l a shareholder brought
suit on behalf of the minority shareholders of a controlled subsidi-
ary, alleging that the parent had imposed an unfair transaction on
the subsidiary. The transaction did not involve shareholder ap-
proval, and consequently no deception of shareholders could have
caused the transaction. However, an allegedly misleading press re-
lease was issued, and the plaintiffs claimed that it deceived them in a
transactionally significant way. Had they not been misled, they
could have marched into state court seeking an injunction against
the unfair transaction. The inaccurate press release lulled them into
acquiescence.
The ability to use federal courts in the manner just described
permits the courts to determine the fairness of the transaction in the
course of determining whether a misstatement or omission was ma-
terial. Of course, this situation will arise only when management
makes a press release or other communication, but virtually every
transaction will involve some communication because the federal se-
curities laws or self-regulatory organizations require public compa-
nies to publish something about the transaction.
State procedural restrictions on the use of shareholder litiga-
tion often will be irrelevant because the federal securities laws are a
presence in almost every case involving a securities transaction, in-
cluding a great many cases involving self-dealing transactions. Yet,
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 50 (1968) (security for expense statutes have little effect on
plaintiffs or defendants).
79 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
80 See McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.) (actions under federal
securities laws do not require bond), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); H. HENN. &J.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 362, at 1063
(3d ed. 1983) (contemporaneous ownership rule inapplicable to actions under federal
securities laws). Federal courts have praised derivative suits for their role in protecting
shareholders' rights. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970)
(shareholder suits help enforce federal statutes protecting investors).
81 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
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F&B totally neglect the critical role of federal law as an influential
source of managers' duties and provider of remedies.
The most significant impediment under corporate law to the ef-
fectiveness of liability rules, as noted by F&B, is the ability of boards
of directors, usually acting through a special litigation committee, to
cause the termination of a derivative suit.8 2 Legal scholars have ob-
served that this power threatens the survival of the derivative suit
because if courts regard the decision to terminate as simply another
exercise of the board's business judgment then they will rarely ex-
amine the action's underlying merits.83 Recently, however, courts
have shown some resistance to yielding so much power to boards,
thus checking an earlier trend that once seemed to be a jugger-
naut.8 4 In Delaware, when demand on the board of directors is un-
necessary because it would be futile, the decision of the board or the
special litigation committee will not be viewed as simply another ex-
ercise of business judgment.8 5 The courts will review the merits of
the decision to terminate the action. On the other hand, if demand
is required, the Delaware courts will apply the business judgment
doctrine to the board's decision. The greatest danger to the future
of the derivative suit in Delaware is the courts' reluctance to excuse
demand. For instance, in a case based on self-dealing between the
corporation and its forty-seven percent shareholder, the court in-
sisted that demand was necessary. 86 Furthermore, Delaware courts
do not permit discovery on the issue of demand-futility, and even
82 See F&B, supra note 1, at 286.
83 See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit. An Evaluation and a Propo-
sal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981); Dent, The Power of Directors to
Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96
(1980); Edwards, Compelled Termination and Corporate Governance: The Big Picture, 10 J.
CORP. L. 373 (1985). Courts also have recognized this danger. See Joy v. North, 692
F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 US. 1051 (1983); Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado, 430 A.2d 779, 783-84 (Del. 1981). But see Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
84 In Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d 779, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that if a plain-
tiff is excused from demanding that the board bring suit, the board's subsequent deci-
sion to dismiss the suit should be subject to a court's independent business judgment.
Id. at 788-89. Several other recent decisions have either disallowed terminations or re-
manded for consideration of whether the proposed dismissal would serve the corpora-
tion's best interests. See Hassan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir.
1984) (summary judgment precluded by issues of fact regarding good faith and fairness
of special litigation committee); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982)(high
probability of substantial return to corporation precludes dismissal of suit), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1051 (1983) ; Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D.
Iowa 1981) (further development of record necessary to determine whether litigation
committee had adequate basis for seeking termination).
85 See Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 784.
86 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). See also Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d
619 (Del. 1984) (shareholder claims that directors had personal interest in alleged
wrong insufficiently particularized to satisfy futility test).
1986] COMMENTS 339
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
when discovery to question the committee's decision is permitted,
the court views it warily.87 Certain other jurisdictions, notably
Iowa88 and more recently North Carolina,89 are more solicitous of
the shareholder's right to maintain the suit despite the contrary
views of the special litigation committee. Nevertheless, the danger
to the derivative suit is serious, and without reform it may succeed
in reducing the derivative suit to impotence.
VI
REFORMING THE LAW: THE ALI PROJECT
The danger of abusing the special litigation committee provides
the strongest case for reform in corporate law. Change may occur
through legislation or merely through courts' recognition that they
need to restrain the application of the business judgment doctrine
as applied to the termination of derivative suits. This is not to say
that the courts should revert to the state of affairs before 1976 when
demand on directors was mainly a ministerial act.9 0 Using a screen-
ing device to preclude some derivative suits is valuable. In this re-
spect I agree wholeheartedly with F&B that derivative suits are not
costless and that we need a mechanism to identify and terminate
unworthy suits at an early stage.
I believe the American Law Institute has succeeded in striking a
balance between the burdens and the benefits of the derivative suit.
F&B do not describe the balancing efforts of the ALI Project, so I
must set forth some of its detail. Their quarrel with the ALI Project
is seemingly not with its detailed solution, but with its very
undertaking.
The ALI Project serves mainly to clarify rather than alter basic
substantive rules. The Project recognizes the existence of a corpo-
ration's power to seek dismissal of a derivative suit on the grounds
that dismissal is in the best interests of the corporation,91 as long as
the proper procedures are followed. The procedures vary depend-
ing upon the nature of the suit and who is sued.92 Moreover, the
ALI permits the board to delegate this authority to a committee of
87 See Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984) (judge has discretion to order
limited discovery to aid court's examination of committee's independence and basis of
its decision), aft'd, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,345 (Oct. 9, 1985).
88 Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
89 Alford v. Shaw, 324 S.E.2d 878 (N.C. App. 1985).
90 Gall v. Exxon, 415 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), was the first case to allow the
decision of a special litigation committee to be the basis for termination of a derivative
suit.
91 ALI PROJECT, supra note 22 § 7.07 (Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985).
92 Compare id. (general rule) with id. § 7.08 (suits against directors and other influen-
tial persons) and id. § 7.09 (suits against actions approved by shareholder resolution).
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disinterested directors.93 If the special committee determines to
dismiss a suit against third parties or junior officers, any challenge
to that termination will be analyzed under the business judgment
rule (or doctrine), and hence the decision will almost never be
disturbed.
94
Suits against senior executives or directors create the thorniest
problem. In this situation the ALI permits the corporation to termi-
nate the suit subject to more intensive judicial review and without
the benefit of the business judgment doctrine. The court must find
that certain procedures were substantially followed, that the justifi-
cation for termination is adequately particularized, that the determi-
nation is made in good faith and warrants dismissal when the costs
and benefits are balanced, and that dismissal would not frustrate
public policy.95 By and large the burden of proof on these issues
rests with the corporation seeking to dismiss. 96 The ALI Project
provides for an even higher standard of review for decisions to dis-
miss suits against controlling persons. If the suit involves the re-
ceipt of an improper personal benefit by the controlling person,
then the burden is on the corporation to show that the action is
without merit or that it will suffer harm from the continuation of the
suit.
9 7
The Project also specifies the composition of a special litigation
committee. The committee must be composed of at least two in-
dependent directors who are capable of making informed and objec-
tive judgments, and they must be assisted by independent counsel
of their choice.98 They must conduct an investigation and prepare a
written report. 99 If the corporation contains no such committee, for
example, when all of the directors are involved in a self-dealing
transaction, then the corporation may ask a court to appoint a spe-
cial panel to act in lieu of the special litigation committee.' 00 When
the corporation seeks dismissal based on the recommendation of
the special panel, the burden of proof is reduced. The ALI would
continue to require that a plaintiff make a demand on directors prior
to initiating a derivative suit.10 1 Unlike the position taken in Dela-
ware, 10 2 however, the proposal severs the demand requirement
93 Id. § 7.06(b).
94 Id. § 7.06(a)(4), (b).
95 Id. § 7.08(a)-(d).
96 See id. § 7.11(b) (corporation bears burden of proof except on issue of frustration
of other legal policies).
97 Id. § 7.08(e) comment h, at 117.
98 Id. § 7.10.
99 Id.
100 Id. § 7.12.
101 Id. § 7.03.
102 See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
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from the question of whether the board may terminate the suit.10 3
The ALI deals with other issues involved in derivative suits,
although these are not as significant as the proposed statement and
analysis concerning termination. The Project would eliminate the
requirement that a shareholder must be a contemporaneous owner
of shares if he acquired his shares before facts relating to the alleged
wrongdoing were publicly disclosed.10 4 As noted earlier, the propo-
sal considers different methods to cap director liability for some
breaches of the duty of due care. 10 5 The Project attempts to deal
with settlement and counsel fees in a way that more closely ties the
amount of the fee to the success of the litigation. 10 6 Later drafts will
deal with indemnification, insurance, and ancillary remedies.
Finally, the ALI reporters are cognizant of a factor which F&B
trivialize in their analysis. In the absence of liability rules and an
effective enforcement mechanism, regulation would almost certainly
ensue. F&B conclude that "making any meaningful statement
about the desirability of private, public, or no enforcement is simply
impossible."' 1 7 Their observation can have meaning only in a
highly theoretical construct. In the real world, not that of the com-
puter or blackboard model, a legislative reaction would be almost
certain. Nor would the nature of that reaction be difficult to predict.
Legislators have already introduced bills to curtail the business
judgment rule in the context of takeovers, 0 8 and new laws impose
stiffer penalties on insider trading'09 and discourage "golden para-
chute" payments."i 0 Legislators cannot ignore the corporate ac-
countability problem, and they are unlikely to regard the
marketplace as the only appropriate mechanism to constrain manag-
ers. If F&B think that there are costs to private enforcement of the
duty of due care and the duty of loyalty, I wonder what they think is
the price of added government regulation?
The ALI's resolution is both balanced and sufficiently attentive
to the cost implications of derivative suits. F&B are not the first
scholars to observe that liability rules and their enforcement are not
costless. I am not sure how they would propose to deal with the
costs that they identify, but their paper implies that we could elimi-
103 ALI PROJECT, supra note 22, § 7.03 comment c, at 54-55 (Discussion Draft No. 1,
1985).
104 Id. § 7.02(a)(1).
105 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
106 ALI PROJECT, supra note 22, § 7.17 (Discussion Draft No. 1, 1985).
107 F&B, supra note 1, at 289.
108 H.R. 5695, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (corporation has burden of proof that
anti-takeover actions were prudent and fair to shareholders).
109 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A. 78 (West Supp. 1985)).
110 I. R. C. § 280G (West Supp. 1985).
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nate derivative suits, and perhaps even liability rules, and investors
would not seem to care nor be adversely affected. Although this
implication is not the formal conclusion of their paper, they march
right to the brink of that recommendation. I believe that neither
logic nor experience supports that view.
CONCLUSION
Liability rules are critical for the protection of investors' inter-
ests in a corporation. Experience, common sense, and judgment all
point to this conclusion, and no available empirical data contradicts
it. A sound theoretical base supports liability rules, principally the
reduction of agency costs where market forces fail to achieve that
result. Liability rules are most significant with respect to breaches
of the duty of loyalty but also serve to deter breaches of the duty of
due care, and hence should be preserved in both contexts.
If liability rules persist, so must enforcement mechanisms. The
most controversial mechanism is the derivative suit, but notwith-
standing its defects, the derivative suit is a candidate for reform, not
rejection. F&B have made no case for its abolition, nor have they
spelled out a coherent program of reform. The ALI Project does
present a reform program, however, and its themes, if not all of its
precise measures, should be accepted.
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